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Good stuff on Vietnam in back

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CENTRAL CONCERNS OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

Prior to my coming to Congress a quarter of a century ago, I thought my stock of solutions to the questions of foreign policy was quite adequate. In fact, as a teacher of history at the University of Montana, which I was, I had a touch of what Senator Fulbright might call the arrogance of brain power. In more common idiom, there were times when I thought I knew it all. That, may I say, is a failing common to exceptional historians, from Herodotus to Schlessinger.

As a new Member of Congress, my background in history was highly useful. I also discovered, however, that my knowledge of international affairs did not go very far. It did not begin to provide much of an understanding, let alone answers, to the critical issues which were emerging as World War II drew to a close. In those days, most of us in government suffered from serious imperfections in our notions of the outside world and widely-held but unfounded hopes for an automatic postwar peace under the United Nations.

We took many wrong tacks along with the right ones in the course of our foreign policy. For many decades to come, historians will be engaged in sorting out the one from the other. We made mistakes in Asia. We made them in Europe. We made them in the United Nations. We made them over the whole range of emerging new international issues.

I, for one, felt my limitations and recognized the need to become a student again. My classroom was Congress, in Committee and on the floor. My extracurricular activity included a great deal of foreign travel, extensive reading and not a little reflection.

To this day, a student I have remained; an expert I am not; and teaching is the profession to which, at some point, I may return. In the latter connection, I should note that my name is still carried, on leave of absence, on the roster of the University of Montana. Moreover, thanks to a seniority system in college teaching, second not even to that of the Congress, I now hold the rank of full Professor of History.

I am constrained to point out that teaching and legislating are the two outstanding examples in American society of the application of a major tenet of Confucianism: that the accumulation of years is to be equated automatically and unquestioningly with the accumulation of wisdom. This principle, I know, is insufferable to the young, tolerable to the middle-aged, and a comfort to those full of years. At this point in time, I must confess that I find a system of seniority tolerably comfortable.

For the present, I have no hesitancy in invoking the authority with which seniority endows me, in order that I may speak to you on what seems to me to be the central concerns of contemporary American foreign policy. Since the end of World War II, I have watched clusters of international problems coalesce into these concerns. The problems cover a whole range of new and tumultuous change. They are, in part, ironic by-products of the immense acceleration of development in science, education and communication, transportation and other technologies. They are expressive of the explosion in population as well as the explosion of nuclear devices. They are indicative of the growth of human expectations and,

hopefully, of human enlightenment. They are problems, however, which despite these new twists, are still undergirded by the vast heritage of human ignorance, fear, want, and hostility from which no part of the globe is free.

The iceberg of change which has moved in international affairs during the past two decades helps to explain the emergence of the U.N. and other international organizations. It is relevant to the social instability and the militarism which have largely followed the ending of 19th century colonial era, notably in Africa. It is involved in the Asian catacylsms--the great economic stirrings in Japan, the immense uncertainties which brood over India and Pakistan and the political tidal waves which, at intervals, have rolled through Chinese society.

The many-sided changes in the human condition during the past two decades also explain the first military alliance in peacetime between ourselves and Western Europe as well as the first major military involvements of the United States on the Asian mainland. They help to explain, finally, the awakening of this nation to the problems which confront the world and ourselves as participants in its indivisible destiny.

It used to be that we tended to stand apart and aloof from the affairs of the rest of the globe. Some have called that period of our history which led up to World War II, the age of isolation. The characterization is glib and somewhat misleading. We were not so much isolated as we were insulated by a fortuitous geographic endowment. The greater part of the nation's historic energies, therefore, could, and, fortunately did, go inward into the development of a rich, ample, and sparsely settled land. We had little need or inclination which would stimulate us to look much beyond this endowment for our needs and--if I may use the term--

for our kicks. Except to sustain a limited curiosity and to satisfy a few exotic wants, we avoided an extensive overseas projection of American power, particularly outside the Western Hemisphere. From a distance, we were content to hold ourselves up to the rest of the world, on the basis of great material achievements and the political heritage of the American Revolution, as a prime example of the perfectability of the national experience.

Since World War II, however, we have found ourselves plunged, hands, feet, and head into the mainstream of the world's affairs. We did not seek this role. We did not want it. Most of us still find the clothes of a great international power, costly, ill-fitting and uncomfortable. Nevertheless, we are unable to get out of them. There is even the probability that some of us have learned not only to tolerate this new garb, but to like it.

In any event, as a sequel to World War II, this nation has come onto the center of the stage of international affairs. In this leading role we have expended an immense amount of resources, energy, and money for a great variety of purposes. We have developed all manner of costly intelligence and informational services. We have developed towering military services whose annual cost is now around $70 billion.

We have fought one war in Asia, and are now engaged in a second. We have narrowly missed involvement in several other peripheral clashes elsewhere. More than twenty years after World War II, we still have something on the order of agreements for mutual security with 40 or more nations. These agreements, in effect, are commitments to military action everywhere on the globe, except, perhaps, the Antarctic. The strategic air force is on a minutes-alert. Intercontinental and other missiles are

pre-set for instant retaliatory launching. Day and night the American navy patrols the seven seas. American soldiers are stationed in many nations abroad; in Europe and Viet Nam, they number in the hundreds of thousands.

These far-flung commitments have been questioned from time to time. In my judgment, it is most proper that pertinent questions be raised about them. Not only do they involve great expenditures of public funds, they carry, at all times, immense implications for the very survival of the nation and civilization. As I see it, we have undertaken so many and scattered defense obligations that any need for the simultaneous honoring of a group of these commitments would find us hard-pressed to provide even a limited response. For that reason, if for no other, it seems to me we would be well-advised to look closely at these military commitments and activities and to weigh carefully their contemporary value.

It would be futile, however, to consider them in a vacuum. Effective surveillance must relate to the central concerns of our foreign policy which, presumably, gave rise to them in the first place. It behooves us to see as clearly as possible whether our understanding of these concerns is up to date. It is incumbent upon us to test and test again the reflexes of our policies not only for adequacy but for excess.

It will serve no useful purpose to continue to measure these reflexes of policy by the sort of generalities which are expressed by the terms "isolationism" or "internationalism." Whatever may have been the case years ago, these yardsticks have long since lost their pertinence. The labels are no guarantee of the efficacy of any course of action or non-action in international relations. What is essential is not the name. What is essential is that the course is timely and adjusts the bonafide interests of the nation to the realities of the contemporary world.

I speak in all candor when I say that there have been tendencies under both Democratic and Republican administrations for foreign policy to lag behind these realities. Until recently, a kind of inertia, for example, has existed with regard to one of the central concerns of American foreign policy--the United States-Soviet confrontation in Europe. Until recently, we have been most reluctant to bring ourselves to face, in policy, the changes which have taken place on that continent.

To be sure, President Eisenhower sought in his administration to restore at least a measure of civility in the conduct of U.S.-Soviet affairs, by his personal associations with the leaders of the Soviet Union. To be sure, President Kennedy, in the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, removed a rigidity which, for years had decreed that agreements should not be concluded with the Soviet Union. It has only been in the last year or two, however, that as a nation we have begun to explore fully the implications of change in Europe and to react to its potentialities in terms of our interests and world peace.

Yet substantial change has been manifest for some time in inner developments in both Eastern Europe and in Western Europe and between the two regions. In Eastern Europe, the immediate postwar isolation from the West was a severe one. It was compounded of political and war-born vendettas, ideological parochialisms, reciprocal fears and the in-turning of human energy to meet the massive demands of post-war reconstruction. Especially since the death of Stalin, however, there has been a general loosening of the ideological and other ~~straight~~ strait-jackets throughout Eastern Europe. There has also been a growing response on the part of governments there to consumer needs, the satisfaction of which involves greatly expanded commerce with the non-Communist world.

As indicative of the breadth of change, communications, travel, cultural exchange and other contacts have grown rapidly between Eastern and Western Europe. The rise of trade levels between the two regions has been very pronounced, and it should be noted that, Berlin Wall notwithstanding, West Germany leads all other non-Communist nations in commerce with Eastern Europe.

For those who read the tea leaves of official sociability, moreover, I would call attention to the recent visits of President Podgorny of the Soviet Union to Italy and the first reception of a Chief of that State by the Pope, as well as Premier Kosygin's warm receptions in Paris and London. One may attach such values as he chooses to these events. The facts of change in Europe, however, speak for themselves. The talk of war subsides; the sounds of intra-European cooperation are heard more clearly on all sides. The European detente has not only begun, it is already well-advanced.

Our reaction to change in Europe includes the groundwork of President Eisenhower and President Kennedy as well as the bridge-building of President Johnson, all of which I have already mentioned.

What is involved in the latter case is a sustained effort in the direction of restoring normalcy to our relations with the Soviet Union and a significant reduction in the military rivalry which, wittingly or unwittingly, could lead to a catastrophic conflict.

A number of significant agreements with the Soviet Union are already involved in this effort. They deal with cultural exchanges, consular questions, commercial aviation, and the peaceful use of outer space. Negotiations are also anticipated, in the near future, to try to limit the incredibly costly rivalry of adding successive and reciprocal "antis" to the ballistic missile systems of each nation. An attempt is

also likely to be made to remove certain long-standing and self-imposed hindrances in law to our peaceful trade with the Eastern European countries.

Many of these measures, of course, involve not only the President but also action by the Congress and, particularly, by the Senate. And, certainly, they involve understanding on the part of the people of the nation. However, emotions run deep on any question of U.S. relations with Communist nations, particularly, in the light of the bloody conflict in Viet Nam. I am frank to say that I have my own reticences about the pursuit of agreements with nations on one side of the globe, while a war against us is being waged with their help on the other. The best judgments we can obtain, however, tell us that the rejection of the contemplated agreements with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe will not make the slightest difference in the situation in Viet Nam. It will, in no way, diminish our casualties or hasten the conclusion of the conflict.

In those circumstances, I do not see that it serves our purposes to turn our backs on agreements which would otherwise be in the interest of this nation. I do not see that we advance the cause of peace by refusing to build more stable relations for peace whenever and wherever an opportunity to do so presents itself.

Moreover, bridge-building to Eastern Europe is not unrelated to the possibility of making constructive changes in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, changes which would also serve the nation's interests. For many years, six divisions of American forces have been consigned to N.A.T.O. in Western Europe. These forces and their dependents involve a U.S. military establishment in Western Europe of well over half a million Americans. It is an undertaking which represents an expenditure of billions of dollars of public funds each year. Yet, I would not begrudge one cent of these

funds if I were persuaded that the six divisions were as essential to peace in Europe, today, as they were believed to be when dispatched there years ago.

But is that the case? I have already mentioned the change in the general climate in Europe which expresses itself in a rapidly growing trade and the expansion of other friendly relations. It should also be noted that within Western Europe, there are obvious doubts about the need for the maintenance of N.A.T.O. at the strength in which it was previously projected. Indeed, the French no longer see any requirement for the presence of U.S. forces, at least not in France, and they have withdrawn their own detachments from N.A.T.O. Command. The United Kingdom has reduced its commitment of men and resources to the Continent and has announced further reductions unless West Germany is prepared to neutralize the exchange costs of maintaining these forces on the Rhine. Other Western Europeans to a greater or lesser degree appear to regard their N.A.T.O. commitments in the same non-urgent fashion.

It is now very evident that the United States alone has felt deeply the need to sustain the full military burden of the earlier common commitment to N.A.T.O. Our allies in Western Europe are much closer to the firing line; yet, in a period of unprecedented economic prosperity they are most unwilling to carry their pledged share. In effect, the Western Europeans have made adjustments in their commitments to N.A.T.O. to reflect over-all changes in Europe and they have made these adjustments unilaterally.

The contrast in performance between ourselves and Western Europe regarding commitments to N.A.T.O. in my judgment, is becoming almost an embarrassment. It moves us apart from the mainstream of European developments and is likely to become a source of friction on both sides which, in the end, can only be harmful to the interests of both sides.

In all frankness, I find it difficult to acquiesce in Executive Branch fears for Western Europe's safety which are obviously far greater than the fear of the Europeans themselves. In all frankness, I find some lack of dignity in the lengths to which these fears have carried our diplomacy. We have begged, badgered and buttered Western Europe in an effort to stimulate a greater contribution to N.A.T.O. In all frankness, I did not relish this nation having been placed in the position of wearing out its welcome in France. I should not like to see that experience repeated elsewhere in Europe. Yet it may well be repeated unless there is a willingness to make timely adjustments.

I have, therefore, joined with 43 other Senators in the introduction of a resolution which recommends to the President that the Executive Branch make substantial reductions in the present deployment of our forces in Western Europe. Personally, I have felt for several years that two or three rather than six divisions would be more than sufficient to underscore our adherence to the North Atlantic Treaty. That figure is in line with estimates of present need which have been advanced by General Eisenhower and General Gavin, both of whom have had a long association with this question. I find it most difficult to comprehend why two divisions are any less effective than six in serving notice that we regard the pledge of the North Atlantic Treaty as binding and our national security as inseparable from that of the North Atlantic region. To talk of six divisions as a manifestation of international resolution and two divisions as an indication of a revived isolationism is to reveal how irrelevant if not downright misleading these terms have become.

On the other side of the globe, in Asia, there looms another central concern of American foreign policy. It is the confrontation with China, across the littoral states of Korea, Japan, Taiwan and Viet Nam.

Almost two decades have passed since the collapse of the national government on the Chinese mainland and its retreat to the island of Taiwan. That event, which occurred when most of you were too young for it to be noticed, was cataclysmic in its consequences. It sundered the fabric of Chinese society and, almost overnight, brought about the disintegration of a main pillar of postwar American foreign policy. In the rubble, the watchword became "wait for the dust to settle" before doing anything about China.

Over the years, the cut-off of contact between ourselves and the Chinese mainland has become, for all practical purposes, total. Americans do not go there. Mainland Chinese do not come here. There is not only an absence of personal contact, there is also a complete absence of trade and communications. Indeed, of all the nations of the world we alone have not only maintained a primary boycott for many years but also seek to enforce a secondary boycott on Chinese exports.

We have had brief confrontations with Chinese spokesmen on various issues over the years, notably at the Geneva Conferences of 1954 and 1962. Our sole continuing diplomatic contact with the Peking government, however, has been the meetings between the U. S. and Chinese Ambassadors in Poland which have gone on regularly for many years and at which no business of significance, so far as I am aware, has been conducted.

In short, "waiting for the dust to settle," has remained the watchword of this nation's relations with three-quarters of a billion Chinese through the administrations of three Presidents. In truth, the dust has not settled. The initial hostility between a revolutionary China for which we had had little sympathy and ourselves was followed almost immediately by the Korean Conflict in which we became directly engaged in

military conflict with the Chinese. Thereafter came the near conflict at the islands of Quemoy and Matsu in the Taiwan Straits. And now, there is again conflict, this time, by proxy in Viet Nam.

Within China, during these years there have been momentous events which have also added to the difficulties and uncertainties of developing a cohesive policy towards the Chinese mainland. The Chinese have exploded nuclear devices at Lop Nor in the Western Asian desert of Sinkiang. Recent ideological conflicts have sent great tremors through the whole of the inner political structure of China. There has been, finally, the great cleavage in Sino-Soviet revolutionary solidarity which has torn apart almost all of the relationships between the two giant nations of the Eurasian Continent.

In the context of these events, it is not surprising that the dust, for the settlement of which American policy has waited eighteen years, is heavier than ever. The obscurity, moreover, is not likely to be dispelled in the near future. There is nothing in the recent history of China which suggests that it will be easier tomorrow than it is today for us to see clearly a direction for effective policy. Whatever course of American relations with China, it will have to be pursued in spite of the dust with which the situation is covered.

Clear-cut choices cannot be expected to be available to us any time in the foreseeable future. On the contrary, American decisions respecting China must inevitably contain a large measure of subjectivity and prayer. Ever-present, will be the possibility of error. These considerations, may I say, apply not only to what we may do respecting China but to what we do not do. The uncertainties and the risks exist no less in the principle of of non-approach to which we have adhered over these years of our times.

History will someday estimate the contribution of this principle--its addition to or subtraction from the interests of the United States and the stability and peace of the Western Pacific.

Under the present approach, for example, we know from a distance that a great fire rages in the core of Chinese Communism. The manifestations are plain in the roars of the Red Guards, in the denunciations and counter-denunciations, in the sudden fall of long-established revolutionaries. They are documented in the inflamatory ideographs which are slashed over the streets and walls of Peking and the other citadels of Chinese Communist power. They are suggested in the political bewilderment which is seen in coastal cities and in the provinces along the inner borders of China and other remote areas.

Indeed, the present turmoil, is such as to make clear that Communist political control which, for nearly two decades, was held by many to be total and irreversible and to extend all the way from Moscow to the farthest reaches of China is actually considerably less than absolute, even in its extension from Peking to the distant Chinese provinces.

We can also note, from afar, the serious difficulties between the Soviet Union and China. The strains have long been explicit in the ideological realm. They have also become increasingly evident in the tension along the Sino-Soviet frontier which runs for thousands of miles between the two countries. What appears involved here is an expression of the historic projection of Czarist Russian interests across the Asian mainland towards Alaska and which, before it receded to more tractable limits, had spread even as far as California and Hawaii. This basic Russian projection to the East persists and rubs against China, at least in border regions of Manchuria,

Mongolia, and in Sinkiang Province. Conversely, an historic Chinese interest remains in many parts of Soviet Asia which at various times have been under at least nominal Chinese authority. The clash of national interests of the two nations, in short, is very real and so, too, are the irredentist hostilities which it engenders.

These hostilities have been a major element in the cycle of ever-increasing bitterness in Chinese-Soviet relations over the past few years. How long this cycle will last and how it will end are matters of conjecture. Whatever the possibilities, if any, of more effective adjustment of our policies in the light of this and other trends, however, we are inhibited from their pursuit by our current approach or, rather, non-approach to mainland China.

Let me turn, finally, to the immediate and over-riding problem of policy, to the situation in Viet Nam. Viet Nam affects every other aspect of our foreign relations and, particularly, the two central concerns. It diminishes our capacity to deal constructively with the United States-Soviet confrontation in Europe. To put it mildly, it multiplies the problems of the confrontation with China in Asia.

It is ironic that once again in Viet Nam, as in Korea, a country so small and remote from our interests as to be outside the range of even public curiosity a few years ago has become the major preoccupation of the United States. It is ironic that, for the second time in a generation, we find ourselves in a devastating war on the borders of China--not with China--but with a people who have had no tradition of hostility towards the United States and who have far more historic reason than do we for mutual hostility with the Chinese.

How deeply we are engaged in this ironic situation is indicated by the current concentration of United States military force in Southeast Asia and, particularly, in Viet Nam. We have well in excess of 400,000 military personnel on the ground in South Viet Nam. There are also approximately 75,000 men on the 7th Fleet in adjacent waters and 35,000 more in Thailand with responsibilities that are tied closely into the situation in Viet Nam. In short, we have committed to this conflict over 500,000 members of the Armed Services and materiel and equipment in unprecedented quantities and this immense consignment is supported by additional military strength of all kinds on Okinawa, the Philippines, and Guam.

We are in a limited war in which, by becoming deeply engaged, we have managed to save from collapse the government of South Viet Nam in Saigon. The objectives of our military engagement are confined entirely to the southern half of Viet Nam. This limited war of limited objectives, nevertheless, has already engaged more American forces than Korea. It has cost more than Korea. It has incurred plane and helicopter losses greatly in excess of those in Korea. It is a more difficult and dangerous war than Korea. It is a more bitter and barbaric war. It is a war whose end is not yet in sight, by military action or by a negotiated diplomatic solution.

That is the reality of the situation in Viet Nam. The more candidly it is faced the better off we will be. At this point, the question of how or why we became involved is moot and so are regrets over our involvement. In my judgment, the question now is how can this war be ended at the soonest possible moment in an honorable peace for ourselves and for all deeply enmeshed in it. In short, the question is how can it be ended under honorable circumstances, before the spreading devastation, not only in North

Viet Nam, but even more, in South Viet Nam, makes a hideous mockery of the original objective of helping the Vietnamese people.

I do not believe that we can end this war by slogans of "get in or get out." It cannot be ended by personal criticism of the President and the Vice President, Ambassador Goldberg and other leaders of the Administration or members of the Senate, regardless of the positions which they take on this issue. I am frank to say that this criticism, at times, goes far beyond the merely ungracious and borders on the disgraceful. President Johnson wants this war ended in an honorable peace and every Senator I know, and I know them all, wants the same thing. If there are differences among us they are differences of understanding, interpretation, and method.

In my personal view, and I have made it clear many times, the conflict cannot be terminated in an honorable fashion by a withdrawal of the United States at this time although an honorable settlement must eventually involve the withdrawal of United States forces.

The only practical avenue which I see open, for the present, is to seek to mitigate the horror of the conflict and to restrain its spread, while endeavoring to pursue any avenue, byway, route or whatever, as the President has sought to do, which might lead to the negotiating table. That there has not yet been an initiation of substantial contact for peace is no argument against the continuance of the effort to make that contact. There can be no relaxation until the war is brought to an end in negotiations. It is essential that we pursue peace in Viet Nam in all sincerity and with all diligence not only because, in this situation, peace has a rational and moral validity, but also because a prompt settlement is in the interests of the Vietnamese people and the interests of the American people.

I must say, with great regret, that signs of a settlement in the near future are lacking. There is, instead, the fact of an ugly war of spreading devastation. All the while, the options are running out; the alternatives which might lead to negotiations grow fewer.

Many proposals have been put forth and many have been explored. As an example, over the past year or more I have publicly called attention to these possible easements of the situation and for eventual settlement:

1. In lieu of aerial bombardment of North Viet Nam, the sealing off of the borders of the 17th parallel, through Laos;
2. A reconvening of the Geneva Conference on the basis of the 1954 and 1962 agreements by call of the co-chairmen, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union, or by any participating conferees;
3. An all-Asian conference at Rangoon or Tokyo or any other suitable location to consider the conditions of an honorable peace;
4. The inclusion in any peace conference of whatever belligerents may be necessary to bring about a termination of the conflict in Viet Nam;
5. An enlargement of the Manila Conference of 1966 into a follow-up conference, to include friend and foe alike;
6. A face-to-face meeting of the Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, and the Foreign Minister of the Peking government to discuss the restoration of peace in Viet Nam.

In addition, I have urged that the closest consideration be given to informed French views on Viet Nam and to the views of the Cambodian Premier, Prince Norodom Sihanouk. I have urged that the proposals of U Thant and Mrs. Gandhi be considered. I have endorsed various statements of the President, Secretary Rusk, and Ambassador Goldberg, all of which have made clear that not only our proposals but also those of Hanoi and the People's Liberation Front might provide a basis for settlement. I have recommended that there be not just a cessation of the bombing of North Viet Nam but that all killing stop, on both sides, in a cease-fire and standfast, on the ground and in the waters adjacent to Viet Nam as well as over Viet Nam, to the end that efforts may be made to initiate talks.

In some of these proposals, the President has concurred and has had them pursued by his diplomats. All of them, he has had examined and if they have not been pursued, I can only conclude that there have been sound reasons for not pursuing them. Suggestions for peace have come from many sources; the actual pursuit of peace in the past year, however, has been by diplomacy and, largely, by secret diplomacy. Indeed, that is the case even with the efforts of the distinguished Secretary General of the United Nations, U Thant. In his attempts to bring about peace in Viet Nam, U Thant has acted in his personal and diplomatic capacity rather than in his Secretarial capacity of carrying out organizational decisions of the United Nations.

The fact is that the U. N., as an organization, has not yet entered into the Vietnamese problem. Some limited useoof the U. N. in this fashion, may I say, was proposed in an address which I delivered at Johns Hopkins University in November, 1966. At the time, it was not suggested

that the United Nations be brought directly into the substance of the dispute; that course presents great difficulties because neither North Viet Nam nor China are member states. What I did suggest, however, was an entirely proper and precedented procedural initiative by the United Nations. The Security Council can issue, at any time, by majority vote a call to all belligerents in Viet Nam to convene in its forum. It would be entirely in order for an invitation of this kind to include both China and North Viet Nam.

It was further suggested last November that a basis for a negotiated settlement could begin to be sought in a Security Council request to the International Court for an advisory opinion on the applicability of the Geneva Accords of 1954 and 1962. I am delighted to note, in passing, that Congress only last week expressed its overwhelming formal endorsement of these agreements as a basis for a negotiated settlement.

I betray no confidences when I note that, on request, I interrupted a brief vacation last fall to go to New York for the sole purpose of discussing these two proposals regarding the possible usage of the U. N. organizatio with Ambassador Goldberg and the Secretary-General. On the basis of these discussions it seemed preferable at the time that the search for peace then being actively pursued be continued via the private avenues of diplomacy rather than in the forum of the Security Council.

That was many weeks and months ago. In the interim, intense and many-sided efforts of diplomacy have been exerted through many private channels to find the key to peace. Hopes rose during the cease-fires at the Christmas holidays and at Tet, the Oriental New Year. However, in the end, diplomacy not only was unable to find a road to negotiations, it was not able even to bring about an extension of these truces.

The Pope tried. The Russian and British leaders have tried. The Secretary-General of the U. N., in his diplomatic capacity, has tried. Ambassador Goldberg has tried countless times. Many other diplomats and officials of the Executive Branch of the government have tried.

The strenuous efforts of traditional diplomacy have been unavailing. As indicated by recent statements of both Ambassador Goldberg and U Thant, the slender reed of hope has shriveled. There is now no immediate prospect on the horizon, except for the intensification of the conflict. That, indeed, is already in progress. The casualties increase; the devastation grows; the dangers of expanded war multiply.

In the circumstances, it seems to me that a contribution to peace might well be sought in public from the United Nations as an organization. The Secretary-General's personal efforts to date have been dedicated and strenuous and he is entitled to the gratitude and support of the entire world community. With all due respect, however, there are other resources for peace inherent in the United Nations, as an organization, which have gone untapped and untried. The U. N. does have a responsibility to try to contribute to the resolution of this conflict. That responsibility is explicit in the Charter and every member nation, including ourselves, shares that responsibility by solemn Treaty obligation.

It seems to me that the cause of a peaceful and honorable settlement may possibly be advanced--certainly it cannot be hurt--by modest recourse at this time to the procedural machinery of the United Nations. In my judgment, this nation should consider seeking a face-to-face confrontation of all belligerents at the United Nations. Following the Korean precedents, it seems to me eminently desirable that this government give every consideration to a possible initiative which would bring to a vote in the Security Council two resolutions along the following lines:

One, that the Security Council invite all belligerents, direct and indirect, including China and North Viet Nam, to participate in an open discussion of the conflict in Viet Nam and ways and means of ending it;

Two, that the Security Council request the International Court to render an advisory opinion on the current applicability of the Geneva Accords of 1954 and 1962 and the obligations which these agreements may place on the present belligerents in Viet Nam.

Whether or not there is much prospect of a positive response from others in no way lessens the desirability of offering these resolutions in good faith and bringing them to a vote. In my judgment, an American initiative of this kind serves not only our interests but the interests of peace in Viet Nam.

Let me conclude, now, by clarifying one point: the conflict in Viet Nam cannot be settled from the Congress or from the campus. In the end, if it is to be settled honorably, there is only one Constitutional officer of your government who can speak for you and for the entire nation in its foreign relations. Whether we agree with him or not, whether we like him or not, whether we abhor him or love him, that man is the President of the United States.

In a government such as ours, a Senator lives with a Constitution, a constituency, and a conscience. All three considerations underlie the suggestions respecting Viet Nam which have been made here today and others which have been expressed on other occasions. President Johnson and all the Presidents who have gone before him have listened to advice from many sources, including the Senate.

It is the President, however, who makes the fundamental decisions of foreign policy. These decisions are of an immensity which enjoins upon us all a high respect for the burdens which a President must bear and a responsibility to tender to him every support which can be given in good conscience. In the end, these decisions will determine--insofar as it lies with this nation to determine--the moment of peace in Viet Nam and Asia.